Briefing Paper, June 2023

GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END WILDLIFE CRIME CALLS FOR WHO PANDEMIC INSTRUMENT TO FULLY ADDRESS HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WILDLIFE TRADE AND MARKETS

On 1 February 2023, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) tasked with the negotiation of a convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (‘Pandemic Instrument’) under the auspices of the World Health Organisation (WHO) released a Zero draft of the accord (named the WHO CA+). In May 2023, a DRAFT Bureau’s text of the WHO CA+ (‘Draft Bureau’s Text’) was circulated ahead of the next round of negotiations, scheduled by the INB for 12-16 June 2023.

The Global Initiative to End Wildlife Crime (EWC) first expressed its support for a Pandemic Instrument in its June 2021 Briefing Paper, urging the global health community to ensure that any such agreement helps prevent future pandemics that could emerge from human interaction with wild animals, and institutionalises a ‘One Health’ approach to wildlife trade and markets. This fourth EWC Briefing Paper is provided to assist Member States in the negotiations of the Pandemic Instrument, including specific proposals on selected provisions of the Draft Bureau’s Text, building upon observations previously made by EWC, including as a part of the Pandemics and Animal Welfare Coalition hosted by Four Paws International.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

EWC welcomes the Draft Bureau’s Text and expresses its appreciation to the INB Bureau for the significant progress made to date. The Draft Bureau’s text represents a step in the right direction, containing much-needed references to “live animal markets”, “wildlife trade” and “animal welfare”.

However, we remain concerned that the Draft Bureau’s text does not yet adequately address the social, environmental and food safety factors that likely led to the COVID-19 Pandemic and the outbreaks that preceded it. For this reason, EWC urges Member States to ensure that the text:

- prioritises preventing pandemics at the source following the recommendations in the OHHLEP White Paper on Prevention of Zoonotic Spillover; the current draft is mainly focused on post-outbreak actions: secondary prevention, preparedness and response;
- fully addresses the role of legal and illegal wildlife trade and live animal markets in the emergence of zoonotic diseases, committing Member States to place tougher regulations on the taking, trading, selling, consumption of wild animals, and to support the transition away from high-risk activities and the development of alternative livelihoods for those who currently rely on such activities;
- encourages States to reduce and eliminate state and private funding for activities that increase the risk of zoonotic pathogen emergence and spillover;
- includes ‘One Health’ as an agreed guiding principle; and
- provides a stronger emphasis on the need to address animal welfare harms.

TEXTUAL PROPOSALS

Blue bold = Proposal for addition
Strikethrough = proposed deletion
*italics* = additional comments
Preamble\(^1\) (p.6)

23. Understanding the critical role of animal health and welfare in pandemic prevention given that most emerging infectious diseases originate in animals, including wild and domesticated animals, then spill over to people, and require adopting and implementing a One Health approach,

23 bis - Further understanding that the capture, transport, trade, marketing for sale and consumption of certain species of wild animals can increase the risk of emergence, proliferation and spill-over of zoonotic diseases, and the need to address these risks at the human-animal interface;

24. Recognizing the importance of working synergistically with other relevant areas, under a One Health approach, as well as the importance and public health impact of growing possible drivers of pandemics; - including but not limited to land use change, ecosystem disturbances and degradation, wildlife trade and live markets - which need to be addressed as a means of preventing future pandemics and protecting public health,

27 bis - Recognizing that additional international obligations are required to minimize the risk of pathogen development and transmission through the consideration of animal health and welfare, and the elimination or mitigation of high-risk activities involving animals,

49 bis - Recognizing that prevention is an investment which provides multi sectoral benefits at a vastly lower cost than response,

Vision (p. 8)

The WHO CA+ aims for a world where pandemics are effectively prevented and controlled to protect present and future generations from pandemics and their devastating consequences, and to advance the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health for all humans, animals and ecosystems, on the basis of equity, human rights and solidarity, with a view to achieving universal health coverage, while recognizing the sovereign rights of countries, acknowledging the differences in levels of development among countries, respecting their national context and recognizing existing relevant international instruments. The WHO CA+ aims to achieve greater equity and effectiveness for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response through the fullest national and international cooperation.

Chapter I. Introduction

Article 1. Definitions and use of terms (p.9)

EWC suggests adding the following definitions:

“Pandemic prevention” refers to actions aimed at addressing and preventing the causes of zoonotic outbreaks. It encompasses measures taken by member states in coordination with relevant sectors and disciplines to address the root causes and drivers of infectious disease outbreaks as well as anticipate, contain, manage and eradicate the occurrence and spillover of viruses and other pathogens from animals to other animals or humans in the first place (primary prevention). Preventing the spillover of pathogens

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\(^1\) The Draft Bureau’s Text of May 2023 does not address preambular paragraphs - these suggestions are based on the text of the Zero draft released in February 2023.
at their source aims to eliminate risk factors for the emergence, proliferation and spill-over of infectious diseases (which can turn into pandemics), especially at the human-animal interface at the time of pathogen shedding through handling, slaughter or consumption. This includes outcomes that promote better animal welfare and health as well as the cessation of high-risk activities including but not limited to: trading in or marketing wild animals at regional, national, or international levels without first assessing the risks of any such practice to animal and/or human health and taking any necessary measures to mitigate such risks;

→ Rationale: the primary objective of the pandemic instrument is to prevent pandemics. Actions to reduce spillover risk (primary prevention) warrant detailed and comprehensive provisions on the same level as those proposed for secondary prevention. The definition of prevention should reflect primary prevention which would entail tackling the root causes and drivers of (re)emerging infectious diseases at the human-animal-environment interface. The interpretation of prevention cannot be limited to post-outbreak measures because such measures neither help achieve equity for the most vulnerable nor prevent future pandemics. Prevention measures must begin with primary prevention as described by Bernstein et al (2022) or “deep prevention”, meaning before a pathogen jumps from animals to humans.

Primary prevention promotes the health and welfare of animals and protects ecosystems through shifting away from factory farming, reducing the number of livestock and improving husbandry systems, preventing human encroachment on wildlife habitats through agricultural land use and deforestation for the production of animal feed, strictly regulating the commercial wildlife trade, and banning fur farms and live animal markets as well as protecting biodiversity and species, thereby preventing the emergence, proliferation and spread of pathogens and subsequent disease outbreaks

“Spillover” means the movement of pathogens from non-human vertebrate animals to humans;

Article 3. General principles and approaches

With regards to principle 8, EWC strongly supports option 8.A (inclusion of One Health as a principle), amended as follows:

8. One Health – Multisectoral and transdisciplinary actions should recognize the interconnection between the health and well-being of people, animals, plants and their shared environment, for which a coherent, integrated and unifying approach should be strengthened and applied with an aim to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems, including through, but not limited to, attention to the prevention of outbreaks due to pathogens resistant to antimicrobial agents, and spillover of zoonotic diseases, arising from high-risk practices involving animals.

11. Central role of WHO – As the directing and coordinating authority on international health work, and the leader of multilateral cooperation in global health governance, WHO is fundamental to strengthening pandemic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of health systems, while also recognising that the WHO does not have the in-house expertise in animal or environmental health, on which it should seek and obtain input from appropriate experts and organizations.

Chapter II. The world together equitably: Achieving equity in, for and through pandemic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of health systems
With regards to article 4, EWC favours option 4B, amended as follows:

**Article 4. Pandemic prevention and public health surveillance**

1. The Parties shall take prevention and surveillance measures that are consistent with and supportive of effective implementation of the International Health Regulations, **while adopting a precautionary approach to high-risk activities.**

2. Each Party shall develop, strengthen, implement, periodically update and review comprehensive multisectoral national infection prevention and control measures, plans and programmes, including those addressing zoonotic diseases and pathogens **and the high-risk activities that make their emergence more likely, such as land conversion, wildlife markets, trade and trafficking.** Toward this end, each Party shall, in accordance with its capabilities:

   
   (e) strengthen animal disease preventive measures, including, but not limited to, on farms, transport of animals, live animal markets, **legal and illegal** trade in wild animals and in veterinary practices both for food-producing and companion animals taking into account the relevant international standards, **while adopting a precautionary approach to high-risk activities, including through supporting a fair and equitable transition for people currently reliant on such activities.** Those measures include water and feed hygiene, infection prevention and control measures, farm sanitation, hygiene and biosecurity and animal welfare support measures.

   

   (...)  

6. Each Party shall develop, strengthen and maintain the capacity to carry out integrated surveillance, including, with respect to (i) infectious diseases in humans, (ii) infectious diseases in animals which present significant risks for zoonotic, including vector-borne, spillover, and (iii) relevant samples taken from specific environmental settings, for the purpose of preventing and controlling the spillover of potentially highly infectious pathogens, including antimicrobial resistant pathogens, across different animal species and between humans and animal populations, **while adopting a precautionary approach to high-risk activities.**

**Article 5. Strengthening pandemic prevention and preparedness through a One Health approach**

*EWC strongly supports the inclusion of this article in the draft accord (option 5.A), amended as follows:*  

1. The Parties, recognizing that the majority of emerging infectious diseases and pandemics are caused by zoonotic pathogens, commit, in the context of pandemic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of health systems, to promote and implement a One Health approach at national, and, as appropriate, at regional and global levels that is coherent, integrated, coordinated and collaborative among all relevant actors, with the application of, and in accordance with, domestic law and existing instruments and initiatives.

2. The Parties, with an aim of safeguarding human, **animal and environmental** health and detecting and preventing health threats, shall promote and enhance synergies between multisectoral and transdisciplinary collaboration at the national level and cooperation at the international level, in order to identify, conduct risk assessment of and share pathogens with pandemic potential at the interface between human, animal and environment ecosystems, while recognizing their interdependence.
3. The Parties will identify and integrate into relevant pandemic prevention and preparedness plans interventions that address the drivers of the emergence and re-emergence of disease at the human-animal-environment interface, including but not limited to climate change, land use change, legal and illegal wildlife trade, live animal markets, desertification and antimicrobial resistance, adopting a precautionary approach.

4. The Parties commit to regularly assess One Health capacities, insofar as they relate to pandemic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of health systems, and to identify gaps, policies and the funding needed to strengthen those capacities.

5. The Parties commit to strengthen synergies with other existing relevant instruments that address the drivers of pandemics, such as climate change, wildlife trade and trafficking, biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and increased risks at the human-animal-environment interface due to human activities.

6. The Parties commit to strengthen multisectoral, coordinated, interoperable and integrated One Health surveillance systems and strengthen laboratory capacity to identify and assess the risks and emergence of pathogens and variants with pandemic potential, in order to prevent disease introduction, minimize spill-over events, mutations and the risks associated with zoonotic neglected tropical and vector-borne diseases, with a view to preventing small-scale outbreaks in wildlife or domesticated animals from occurring, or once they occur from becoming a pandemic.

7. Each Party shall in accordance with the national context and to the extent necessary, to protect human, animal, or plant life or health:

   (a) implement science-based actions, including but not limited to improving infection prevention measures, antimicrobial research and development, access to and stewardship of antimicrobials, harmonisation of surveillance and management of environmental antimicrobial run-off, strictly regulating wildlife trade, farming and consumption and phasing out the use of high-risk species and activities, to prevent, reduce the risk of, and prepare for pandemics from zoonotic pathogens and pathogens resistant to antimicrobial agents, taking into account relevant tools and guidelines, through a One Health approach, and collaborate with relevant partners, including the Quadripartite;

   (b) foster and implement actions at national and community levels that encompass whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to prevent and control zoonotic outbreaks (in wildlife and domesticated animals), including engagement of communities in surveillance that identifies zoonotic outbreaks and antimicrobial resistance at source;

   (c) develop and implement a national One Health action plan on antimicrobial resistance that strengthens antimicrobial stewardship in the human and animal sectors, optimizes antimicrobial consumption, increases investment in, and promotes equitable and affordable access to, new medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines and other interventions, strengthens infection prevention and control in health care settings and sanitation and biosecurity in livestock farms, and provides technical support to developing countries;

   (d) Implement One Health surveillance mechanisms using data collected from and shared across human, animal, and environmental sources for the purpose of preventing and controlling the spillover of pathogens with pandemic potential between humans and animal populations, as well as between
different animal species, and utilise the results of such surveillance to identify and eliminate high-risk activities;

(e) take the One Health approach into account at national, subnational and facility levels in order to produce science-based evidence, including related to the social and behavioural sciences and risk communication and community engagement to enable, public education and behaviour change, and support, facilitate and/or oversee the correct, evidence-based and risk-informed implementation of infection prevention and control; and

(...)
5. Each Party, based on national capacities, shall take necessary steps to address the social, environmental and economic determinants of health, and vulnerability conditions that contribute to the emergence and spread of pandemics, and prevent or mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of pandemics, including but not limited to, those affecting economic growth, the environment, employment, trade, transport, gender equality, education, social assistance, housing, food insecurity, nutrition and culture, and especially for persons in vulnerable situations, while supporting the fair and equitable transition away from activities that carry high risk, and towards alternative livelihood and employment opportunities.

(...) 

Article 19. Financing

The Parties recognize the important role that sustainable financial resources play in achieving the objective of the WHO CA+ and the primary financial responsibility of national governments in protecting and promoting the health of their populations. In that regard, each Party shall:

(a) cooperate with other Parties, as appropriate and within the means and resources at its disposal, to raise sustainable financial resources for effective implementation of the WHO CA+ through bilateral and multilateral, regional or sub-regional funding mechanisms;

(b) plan and provide adequate financial support, in line with its national fiscal capacities, for: (i) strengthening and sustaining capacities for pandemic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of health systems, including through support for transitioning people away from high-risk activities; (ii) implementing its national plans, programmes and priorities; and (iii) strengthening health systems and progressive realization of universal health coverage for pandemic prevention, preparedness, response;

(...) 

ABOUT THE INITIATIVE

The Global Initiative to End Wildlife Crime is a broad alliance of environmental, policy, legal, business and public health organisations and experts coming from across every continent, created to address serious gaps in the existing international legal framework for combating wildlife crime and regulating wildlife trade. For more information, visit our website.

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